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NOTES
TEXAS V. UNITED STATES:. THE LEGALITY OF THE
SECRETARIAL PROCEDURES FOLLOWING SEMINOLE
TRIBE OF FLORIDA V. FLORIDA
Gregory R. Mulkey*
I Introduction
Class III gaming, which includes slot machines and other high-stakes
games, has become a major source of revenue for Indian tribes. The national
revenues from Indian gaming in 2007 were $26.5 billion.' Until 1988, States
did not have any authority to regulate gaming on Indian reservations. With the
enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), Congress changed
the regulation of Indian gaming and expressly granted states limited control
over Class III gaming.'
IGRA provides Indian tribes the ability to negotiate with the states to come
to an agreement about the procedures governing Class III gaming on a tribe's
reservation.3 Congress also put in safeguards for tribes in case states did not
want to negotiate or negotiated in bad faith, which allows tribes to bring suit
against states.4 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,5 the Supreme Court
found that Congress did not have the authority to take states' sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. After Seminole Tribe, a tribe's
only remedy for a state not negotiating in good faith was to have the state
waive its immunity or have the United States bring suit against the state on the
tribe's behalf.6 The Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) created new
procedures for tribes to use when a state did not negotiate or negotiate in good
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Joe Nelson, Indian GamingRevenue Growth Dips, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL., Aug.
20, 2008, available in LEXIS, News & Business Directory, All News File.
2. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (2006).
3. Id. § 27 10(d).
4. Id. § 2710(d)(7).
5. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
6. See id.
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faith and claimed sovereign immunity.7 In Texas v. United States, the Fifth
Circuit found the Secretarial Procedures invalid.8
This note consists of four parts, each addressing various aspects of United
States v. Texas and IGRA. To start, Part II discusses IGRA, the Secretarial
Procedures, and the case law leading to Texas. Part III contains the factual
background, issue, and holding of Texas. Then Part IV provides the Fifth
Circuit's rationale in the case. Part V examines the accuracy of the court's
analysis and holding in the case, discusses the need for congressional action,
and possible actions Congress could take.
I. Law Before Texas v. United States
A. The Law Before IGRA
Tribal Indians on their reservations were not subject to state gaming laws
before the enactment of the IGRA.9 The Supreme Court has held "tribal
sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government,
not the States."' 0 While tribes are not subordinate to the states, Congress can
expressly provide that certain state laws can govern tribes on their
reservations. "
The Supreme Court determined states could not regulate tribal gaming in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.2 The Court held California
could not regulate tribal gaming on the reservations because "[s]tate regulation
would impermissibly infringe on tribal government."' 3 In Cabazon, California
argued Congress had given the State authority to apply the State's gaming laws
to tribal gaming through Public Law 280 and the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA).
14
The Supreme Court held Public Law 280 and the OCCA did not grant
California the authority to regulate tribal gaming. 5 "In Pub. L. 280, Congress
7. See Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289 (proposed Jan. 22, 1998) (codified
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291).
8. See Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
9. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
10. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
154 (1980).
11. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207.
12. See id at 202.
13. Id. at222.





expressly granted... California ... broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State" and
a more limited civil jurisdiction. 6 A civil state law only applies to tribes,
under Public Law 280, when private civil litigation is brought against
"reservation Indians" in state court. 17 The Court found California's law
regulating bingo, which the State sought to apply to tribes, was meant to
regulate gaming." State laws that regulate, instead of prohibit, are considered
civil laws under Public Law 280; therefore, Public Law 280 did not give
California the authority to regulate tribal gaming on reservations. 9
The OCCA makes a gambling business operated contrary to state law a
violation of federal law.2' The Court determined the OCCA did not give states
authority to enforce federal law on Indian reservations, if states could not do
so without the OCCA.2' The Court's rejection of California's two premises of
expressly granted congressional authority to regulate tribal gaming on Indian
reservations left states with no power to regulate tribal gaming on Indian
reservations.22 After Cabazon was decided, Congress enacted IGRA to give
states a limited role in tribal gaming and to establish procedures governing
tribal gaming.23
B. The Enactment of IGRA
In 1988, Congress enacted IGRA to give Indian tribes a statutory basis for
gaming operations and to allow the federal government to regulate tribal
gaming.24 IGRA established three classes of tribal gaming.25 Class I and H
gaming includes social games with "prizes of minimal value," as well as bingo
and card games authorized by state law.26 Class III gaming includes anything
that is not Class I or II gaming.27
16. Id.
17. Id. at 208.
18. Id. at211.
19. See id. at 207-13.
20. Id. at212-13.
21. Id. at 213-14.
22. See generally id. at 202.
23. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (2006)).
24. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
25. Id. § 2710(a)-(d).
26. Id. § 2703(6), (7).
27. Id. § 2703(8).
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Class I and II gaming activities remain within the jurisdiction of Indian
tribes, with Class II gaming also subject to the provisions within Chapter 29.28
On the other hand, Congress granted states some power with respect to Class
III gaming.29 In addition to the adoption of an ordinance or resolution by the
Indian tribe with jurisdiction over the land, and approval by the Chairman of
the National Indian Gaming Commission, the Indian tribe and the state where
the reservation is located must enter a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming
activities to be lawful.3"
An Indian tribe can enter a tribal-state compact in two ways.3 ' First, the
tribe can request that the state enter good-faith negotiations with the tribe, and
the state can agree and enter into a negotiated tribal-state compact.3 2 Second,
the tribe can sue the state after 180 days from the time of the tribe's request for
negotiations of a tribal-state compact.33 For the tribe to bring suit against the
state, the parties must not have entered a tribal-state compact and the state
must have failed to respond to the tribe's request or failed to negotiate in good
faith.
34
After a tribe sues the state, the court must determine if the state negotiated
in bad faith. "If... the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in
good faith with the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact.., the
court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact
within a 60-day period. 35 If the state and tribe cannot come to an agreement
within the sixty-day period, then each party must submit their last best offer
to a court-appointed mediator.36 The mediator will select the proposition that
best meets the terms of IGRA and Chapter 25, and the state can either consent
or refuse to consent to the proposition selected.37 If the state does not consent
to the chosen proposal, the Secretary will prescribe procedures, with the
consultation of the tribe and based on the mediator's chosen proposal, that will
govern the proposed Class III gaming.a
28. Id. § 27 10(a).
29. See id. § 2710(d).
30. Id. § 2710(d)(1).
31. See id. § 2710(d).
32. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
33. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
34. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
35. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
36. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
37. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)-(vii).
38. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol33/iss2/5
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The tribal-state compact is required for Class III gaming to comply with
federal criminal law.39 It is illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 to conduct Class III
gaming in opposition to state laws without a tribal-state compact.40 The
second course used by tribes to enter a tribal-state compact, through a court
action against the state, was constitutionally challenged in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida.4
C. The Constitutionality of IGRA
In accordance with the jurisdiction granted in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A),
the Seminole Tribe of Florida (the "Seminole Tribe") sued the State of Florida
and its Governor (the "respondents"), alleging the State refused to enter
negotiations for a tribal-state compact.42 The "[riespondents moved to dismiss
the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court.
43
The Supreme Court had to determine if Congress could authorize suits by
Indian tribes against states without violating the Eleventh Amendment.' To
determine if Congress had abolished states' immunity from suit, the Court
determined if it was Congress's intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity
and whether Congress had the power to take away the immunity.45 The Court
found Congress clearly intended to abrogate the states' immunity in IGRA;
however, the Court found Congress did not have the power through the Indian
Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' immunity.' 6 The Court's holding that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Indian tribes from suing a state claiming
sovereign immunity invalidated the second course of entering a tribal-state
compact. The holding left tribes with only two alternative courses of action
if a state refused to negotiate in good faith: (1) have the state waive its
immunity, or (2) have the United States sue the state on the tribe's behalf.
47
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2006).
40. Id.
41. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
42. Id. at51-52.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Id. at 53. The Court also examined the doctrine ofExparte Young to determine if a suit
for bad-faith negotiation could be brought against the Governor. Id. This question is not
relevant to this article and will not be discussed further.
45. See id. at 55-73.
46. Id.
47. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
D. The Changes Made After Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
In response to Seminole Tribe, the Secretary proposed rules that would
allow the Secretary to end the "stalemate" between Indian tribes and states that
could not agree to a tribal-state compact by allowing the Secretary to prescribe
the procedures governing Class III gaming.48 The Secretary claimed Congress
delegated to the Secretary the authority to make these prescriptions of Class
III gaming procedures through 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), 2, and 9.49
The Secretarial Procedures state that after the 180-day period following an
Indian tribe's request for negotiations, and a state's refusal to negotiate or
negotiating in bad faith, the tribe should contact the Secretary and the
Secretary will prescribe the regulations of Class III gaming on the tribe's
land.50 The procedures adopted by the Secretary led to the dispute in Texas v.
United States.5
IlL Texas v. United States
A. Factual Background
In 1995, the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas (the Kickapoo) petitioned
the State of Texas to enter negotiations for a Class III gaming compact. 2
Texas would not negotiate with the Kickapoo.5 The Kickapoo originally filed
suit against Texas; however, the suit was later dismissed after the Supreme
Court decided Seminole Tribe.14 "In 2004, the Kickapoo submitted a proposal
to the Secretary, who followed the Secretarial Procedures and invited Texas
to comment. Texas responded with [a] lawsuit asking the court to declare the
Secretarial Procedures unauthorized and unconstitutional."55
The district court found Texas had standing, but the claims were not ripe.56
The court still "opined that the Secretary had implied authority under IGRA
and his general statutory responsibility for Indian tribes to promulgate the
Procedures., 57 The district court used the Chevron test to determine if the
48. Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289, 3290 (proposed Jan. 22, 1998)
(codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Texas, 497 F.3d 491.









Secretary had the authority to enact the procedures for Class III gaming and
if they were reasonable.58
Under the first step of the Chevron test, the district court had to determine
if Congress had spoken directly to the disputed issue, which was the
Secretary's creation of the procedures to fill the gap left by Seminole Tribe.5"
The court did not give any analysis for its outcome, and only stated, "[I]n this
case, there is no dispute that Congress has not addressed this issue."'
The district court then used the second step of the Chevron test to determine
if the Secretary's interpretation was reasonable; if so, deference would be
given to the interpretation.6 The district court first determined the Secretary
had authority to promulgate regulations regarding Indian affairs under 25
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9.62 Section 9 gives the President the authority to regulate
Indian affairs. 63 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs is delegated, through §
2, the authority to manage all Indian affairs and "all matters arising out of
Indian relations.'" Next, the court found the Secretarial Procedures
reasonable because the Secretary had authority and the Procedures follow the
"compacting and remedy provisions" of IGRA.65
B. Issue
The issue this note will focus on is the authority of the Secretary to
authorize the Secretarial Procedures and the reasonableness of the
Procedures. 66 The State of Texas claimed the Secretarial Procedures were
unconstitutional and unauthorized by IGRA. 67 The Fifth Circuit used the
Chevron test to determine whether IGRA authorized the Secretarial
Procedures, which allowed the court to avoid the constitutional issues.68
58. Texas v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 2d 765, 770 (W.D. Tex. 2004), rev'd, 497 F.3d






63. 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
64. Id. § 2.
65. Texas, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
66. Also at issue was Texas's standing to bring the case and the ripeness of the cause of
action. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
67. Id. at 499.
68. Id.
No. 2]
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C. Fifth Circuit Holding
The Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he Secretarial Procedures violate the
unambiguous language of IGRA and congressional intent by bypassing the
neutral judicial process that centrally protects the state's role in authorizing
tribal Class III gaming." 69 The court held that "[t]he Secretarial Procedures
[were] invalid and constitute[d] an unreasonable interpretation of IGRA."7
This holding by the Fifth Circuit was contrary to the district court's finding
that the Secretary had the authority to enact the new procedures and that the
new procedures were reasonable.71
IV. Fifth Circuit Rationale
The court avoided the constitutionality issue, and instead, turned to the
Chevron test to determine if the Secretarial Procedures were authorized by
IGRA.72 The Chevron test consists of two steps to examine the validity of
challenged administrative regulations.73 The first step determines if a statute
is ambiguous or silent concerning the scope of secretarial authority.74 Step two
examines whether the regulations reasonably flow from the statute when
viewed in context of the overall legislative framework and the policies that
animated Congress's design."
The court quoted the inquiry under Chevron step one as "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."76 The court began by
looking at the plain language of IGRA and noted how 25 U.S.C. §
27 1 0(d)(7)(B)(I)-(vi) only gives the Secretary authority to intervene as a final
step after mediation.77 The court determined that the statute was clear and
unambiguous, but went on to address the appellees' claim that because




71. See Texas v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 2d 765 (W.D. Tex. 2004), rev'd, 497 F.3d 491
(5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
72. Texas, 497 F.3d at 499.
73. Id. at 501.
74. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
75. Id.
76. Texas, 497 F.3d at 501.
77. Id.




The court addressed the appellees' claim by explaining why an agency or
court cannot assume Congress's intent through unspoken situations. 9 The
court stated that "[a]gency authority may not be lightly presumed," because
agency power would be too broad and limitless.80 The court closed its analysis
by saying that Congress clearly left the Secretary little remedial authority and
the Secretary was inferring too much from what little authority was granted to
him."'
The "[a]ppellees further contend[ed] that a judicial decision can, ex post
facto, create a Chevron-type 'gap' that introduces ambiguity into the operation
of a statutory scheme and thereby authorizes an administrative agency to step
in and remedy the ambiguity. 82 The court stated that Chevron requires that
the gap be left open by Congress and not made by the court.8 The court stated
that "Congress has the power to confer expansive interpretive authority on
agencies to accommodate changing or unpredictable circumstances." 84 The
court reasoned that if Congress wanted to confer that type of authority to the
Secretary, it knows how to write the statute to permit a flexible interpretation. 5
The court then moved to step two of the Chevron test, stating that even if
the Secretary was able to ignore Congress's explicit limitations because of the
decision in Seminole Tribe, the Secretarial Procedures would not pass step
two.8 6 Step two requires that the Secretarial Procedures "reasonably effectuate
Congress's intent for IGRA. 's  If the Secretary's "choice represents a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute," a court will not disturb that choice "unless it
appears from the statute or legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned."88
The court points out Congress balanced the interests of the states and Indian
tribes when it created IGRA.8 9 The court further states that Congress put in
place protection for the states in the case that the negotiations were
79. Id.
80. Id. at 502-03.
81. Id. at 503.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 504.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 506.
87. Id.
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unsuccessful; an impartial judicial intermediary would resolve the issue.9" The
court contends that "[t]he role the Secretary plays and the power he wields
under the [Secretarial] Procedures bear no resemblance to the secretarial power
expressly delegated by Congress under IGRA." 9' The court gave four reasons
for why the Secretarial Procedures did not bear resemblance to the delegated
powers in IGRA.92 Consequently, the court rendered the Procedures invalid
under step two of the Chevron test.
9 3
The final claim raised by the appellees was that Secretarial authority is
derived from general Indian trust statutes when read with §
2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).94  "[C]ourts may consider 'generally conferred
authority[.]'" 95 The court found that the sections the appellees referred to did
not grant the Secretary "a general power to make rules governing Indian
conduct. Instead, the authority Congress there delegated to the Secretary only
allows prescription of regulations that implement 'specific laws,' and that are
consistent with other relevant federal legislation." '96
In summary, the court used the Chevron test to determine if the intent of
Congress was ambiguous, which could give the Secretary the authority to
make these Procedures. The court's analysis of steps one and two of the
Chevron test made it clear to the court that Congress gave the Secretary limited
authority, and the intent of Congress to do so was clear in the statutes.
90. Id. at 507.
91. Id. at 508.
92. Id.
First, IGRA interposes, before any secretarial involvement, the requirement
that an impartial factfinder determine whether the state has negotiated in good
faith. Under the Secretarial Procedures, however, it matters not that a state
undertook good-faith negotiations with the tribe: The Secretary may prescribe
Class III gaming irrespective of a state's good faith.... Second, under IGRA, if
mediation is ordered, it is undertaken by a neutral, judicially-appointed
mediator. . . . Under the Procedures, however, the Secretary selects the
mediator .... Third, whereas under IGRA's remedial scheme the court-appointed
mediator essentially defines the regulations that the Secretary may promulgate, the
Procedures enable the Secretary to disregard not only the mediator's proposal, but
also the proposals of the state and tribe .... Fourth, the Secretarial Procedures
contemplate Class III gaming in the absence of a tribal-state compact-directly
in derogation of Congress's repeated and emphatic insistence.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 509.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).





A. The Accuracy of the Rationale and Holding in Texas v. United States
The court in Texas had to determine the validity of the Secretarial
Procedures, which were proposed in the wake of Seminole Tribe.97 The
Chevron test was the correct test for the court to use to determine if the
Secretary had congressionally granted authority to propose the new Class III
gaming procedures. "[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority. ' g8 Like the Chevron court, the court in Texas
was "review[ing] an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers." 99 The matter to be determined was whether the Secretarial
Procedures should get Chevron deference.
The beginning point of analysis starts with the first step in the Chevron test.
Here, the court must determine if Congress specifically addressed the precise
issue at hand.' If Congress did not specifically address the issue, then the
court must move to step two and determine if the agency's statutory
interpretation is reasonable.' To move to step two, the Chevron test
implicitly requires the agency to have congressional authority to act. 2
The Fifth Circuit found in Texas that "Congress did not explicitly authorize
the Secretarial Procedures."' °3 The reasoning used by the Fifth Circuit was
that Congress gave the Secretary a limited role in the Class III gaming
procedures only after judicial remedies and mediation had not produced a
tribal-state compact. The court therefore reasoned the Secretary did not have
congressional authority to make these Procedures after Seminole Tribe created
a gap in IGRA procedures.'°4
97. See id.
98. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001).
99. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842 (1984); see
Texas, 497 F.3d at 501.
100. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
101. Id. at 843.
102. See id. at 842-44.
103. Texas, 497 F.3d at 501.
104. Id. at 502.
No. 2]
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The Fifth Circuit, in its opinion, strictly confined its analysis of the
Secretary's authority to the provisions of IGRA.'0° The court did not address
the general authority of the Secretary derived from 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9 until
after it conducted step two of the Chevron test'6 The court recognized
through United States v. Mead Corp. that courts can consider "generally
conferred authority" in determining the authority of the Secretary, but the Fifth
Circuit found 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9 did not give the Secretary general rule-
making power over Indian conduct." 7 Rather, the court said the Secretary
only has the power to prescribe "regulations that implement 'specific laws,'
and that are consistent with other relevant federal legislation."' 8
The court cited to several cases to illustrate that the Secretary was only
relying on the general authority statutes and not prescribing regulations that
implemented preexisting rights and laws. ,9 The court used the cases to prove
the Secretary cannot create regulations that give Indians rights that were not
previously statutorily granted."0 The court found that IGRA does not
guarantee tribes the right to conduct Class III gaming; therefore, the Secretary
could not use the general authority statutes to fill in the gap left by Seminole
Tribe.111
While the court separates its analysis of the Chevron test and the Secretary's
generally conferred authority, the general authority of the Secretary should be
considered during the analysis of step one of the Chevron test. The Secretary's
general authority is enough to prove the Secretary has been delegated power
to promulgate regulations for IGRA, after Seminole Tribe created the gap in
the Class HI gaming procedures.
The Honorable James L. Dennis, in his dissent, also found the Secretary had
the power to proscribe the new procedures."' Circuit Judge Dennis said, based
upon Mead, IGRA does not have to specifically delegate to the Secretary the
authority to provide the new procedures. "3 Mead reiterates that the Supreme
105. See generally id.
106. See id. at 506-09.
107. Id. at 509 (citation omitted).




112. See id. at 517 (dissent).
113. Id. United States v. Mead Corp. states:
Congress... may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to
implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be
apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol33/iss2/5
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Court looks to generally conferred authority to determine what Congress
would expect an agency to do when a gap needs to be filled, instead of looking
only to the statutory language." 4
Mead proves that in a situation where a gap or ambiguity comes up-even
if Congress did not intend the result-Congress may expect a certain agency
to step in and fill the gap or ambiguity even without expressed authority." 5
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Texas did not dismiss the fact that the Secretary
does have general authority, however, the court found that the Secretary's
general authority did not include the power to implement the Class III gaming
procedures. " 6 The Supreme Court in Morton v. Ruiz set out the powers of the
Secretary by stating:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. In the area of Indian
affairs, the Executive has long been empowered to promulgate
rules and policies, and the power has been given explicitly to the
Secretary and his delegates at the BIA."1
7
From this quote, it is apparent the Secretary is expected and has the power to
make rules and policies dealing with Indian affairs. IGRA regulates gaming
on tribal lands, an area of Indian affairs.
The main reasoning the court used to find that the general authority statutes
did not permit the Secretary to create these Procedures was that IGRA did not
guarantee tribes the right to Class II1 gaming, and therefore, the Secretary did
not have a statutory right that is required under Mead."8 Relying on Morton,
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law, even one about which "Congress did not actually have an intent" as
to a particular result. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a
reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally
conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the
agency's chosen resolution seems unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency's
position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the
agency's interpretation is reasonable.
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (citations omitted).
114. See generally Mead, 533 U.S. 218.
115. See id.
116. See Texas, 497 F.3d at 509-11.
117. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (citations omitted).
118. See Texas,497F.3dat5ll.
No. 2]
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Circuit Judge Dennis, in his dissent, said the Chief Judge's opinion incorrectly
used the phrase "statutory antecedent."" 9 The courts have only required a
statute or law relating to Indian affairs be enacted before the Secretary
promulgates rules or regulations to carry it into effect. 2
In addition to the dissent's reasons for rejecting the court's finding that the
Secretary did not have general authority to prescribe the Secretarial
Procedures, the cases the court relied on to prove the Secretary's lack of
authority actually help show the opposite. In Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, the Secretary prescribed regulations allowing the Kake to operate
fishing traps, which violated Alaska fish trapping laws.' 2 ' The Supreme Court
found that these regulations were in excess of the Secretary's general authority
because there was not a statutory right allowing the Kake to trap in Alaska.'22
The court used Village of Kake to show its similarity to Texas.12 The court
focused on the issue of the Secretary's lack of authority to promulgate
regulations without statutorily defined rights. 2 4 Village of Kake, however,
actually helps prove the Secretary did have authority to prescribe the
Secretarial Procedures. IGRA gives Indian tribes the right to conduct Class III
gaming operations on tribal land as long as the tribe goes through the
procedures set out in IGRA. 25 Unlike Village of Kake, Texas includes IGRA,
which grants tribes the right to Class III gaming operations, and therefore it is
not the Secretary who is guaranteeing tribes the right to conduct Class III
gaming, as the court in Texas held.'26 Rather, the Secretary is just prescribing
new procedures for a tribe to go through for the opportunity to conduct Class
III gaming. 27 The Secretarial Procedures only give tribes an opportunity to
conduct Class III gaming. 2  The Procedures did not turn IGRA into a
guaranteed right to Class III gaming.
29
119. Id. at 520 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
121. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
122. See id.
123. See Texas, 497 F.3d at 509-11.
124. See id.
125. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
126. See Texas, 497 F.3d at 511.
127. See Class III Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289 (proposed Jan. 22, 1998) (codified






The other case the court used as an illustration of the Secretary's lack of
authority was United States v. Eberhardt.3' In Eberhardt, the Ninth Circuit
found fishing regulations imposed by the Secretary valid because there were
preexisting fishing rights granted by Congress.' Eberhardt, like Village of
Kake, again shows the Secretary is authorized to create regulations regarding
Indian affairs when there is a preexisting statutory right. For the reasons just
discussed, the Secretary has the authority to promulgate the Secretarial
Procedures governing Class III gaming, and therefore passes step one of the
Chevron test because Congress did not expressly speak to the issue in IGRA.
Now the court's analysis of step two of the Chevron test must be examined.
Step two of the Chevron test requires the court to determine if the agency's
regulations reasonably represent the intent of the statute and legislative
history.'32 The Texas court found the Secretarial Procedures unreasonable
because they "clearly violate[d] IGRA's intent."' 33 The court gave four main
reasons for why the Secretarial Procedures did not conform to Congress's
intent behind IGRA. These reasons were that under the Secretary's
Procedures: (1) there is not a determination of whether or not the state
negotiated in good faith; (2) the Secretary, instead of the court, appoints a
mediator; (3) the Secretary can disregard proposals of the mediator, tribe, and
state and promulgate her own; and (4) there does not have to be a tribal-state
compact.
34
Chevron gives deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute, and a
court, basing its decision on the statue and legislative history, should not
overrule an agency's decision unless Congress would not have sanctioned the
agency's decision. 35  The court must focus on the reasonableness of the
agency's resolution and whether Congress would have sanctioned the
resolution; consequently, a court should not reject an agency's decision
because it seems unwise.
36
First, the court claims that under the Secretarial Procedures there is not a
determination of whether the State actually negotiated in good faith, which
does exist in the original provisions of the IGRA.'37 Under the Secretarial
130. 789 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. See id.
132. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984).
133. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
134. See id. at 508-09.
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
136. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
137. See Texas, 497 F.3d at 508; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(I) (2006).
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Procedures a tribe can request that the Secretary issue Class III gaming
procedures when: (a) the tribe has requested that the state enter negotiations
to create a tribal-state compact; (b) a compact has not been negotiated after
180 days, from the tribe's request; (c) the tribe brought suit against the state
claiming the state would not negotiate or negotiated in bad faith; (d) the state
claimed its sovereign immunity defense; and (e) the court dismissed the
actions because of the state's sovereign immunity.13 If all of the conditions
have been met then the state has the opportunity to comment on the tribe's
proposal and affirm whether the proposal violates state laws or if the state even
allows the proposed gaming activities by others in the state, and the state may
also submit an alternative proposal.
1 39
The Secretarial Procedures do not provide for a judgment of the state's
actions in negotiations with the tribe, but the Secretarial Procedures do provide
safeguards to prevent a tribe from bringing frivolous, bad-faith allegations
against the state. 40 The state also has the opportunity to tell the Secretary why
the tribe's proposal is not in accord with state law or give other reasons why
the tribe's proposal should not be accepted.' 41 The state then has the ability to
submit an alternative proposal.
1 42
The Secretarial Procedures still give states protection against frivolous
claims from tribes. A tribe still has to file a lawsuit in federal court, and the
state must claim sovereign immunity before a tribe can call on the Secretary
to provide Class III gaming procedures. 43 If a state has negotiated in good
faith and the tribe is bringing a frivolous claim against the state, then the state
may waive its sovereign immunity and allow the court to make a ruling on the
matter. If a state chooses to claim sovereign immunity and forego trial, the
state still has the ability under the Secretarial Procedures to provide reasons
proving the tribe's proposal cannot work in the state or the state can submit an
alternative proposal to the Secretary.'" Given the similar nature of the
Secretarial Procedures and the provisions of IGRA regarding a good faith
determination, Congress would likely sanction this part of the Secretarial
Procedures.
138. 25 C.F.R. § 291.3 (2008).
139. Id. § 291.7.
140. See id. § 291.3.
141. Id. § 291.7(b).
142. Id. § 291.7(c).
143. Id. § 291.3.




Second, the court finds the Secretarial Procedures to be unreasonable
because the Secretary, rather than the court, appoints the mediator."' When
a state submits an alternative proposal to the Secretary, the Secretary then
appoints a mediator to "resolve differences between the two proposals."' 6 The
mediator selected must not have any "official, financial, or personal conflict
of interest with respect to the issues in controversy."' 47 The court claims that
because the Secretary has an obligation to "protect the interests of Indian
tribes," the mediation process is biased.'48 The court then stated that "the
Secretary cannot play the role of tribal trustee and objective arbiter of both
parties' interest simultaneously."'49
The Secretary should not be an "objective arbiter," and she is not; "the
person appointed as a mediator is the fair and impartial decider."' 15 The
Secretary is only selecting the mediator who will preside over the dispute. The
mediator is the person who needs to be impartial and is ultimately deciding
what proposal best fits the terms of IGRA.15' The Secretarial Procedures seek
to prevent biased decision makers by requiring that the selected mediator not
have any conflicts of interest with the issue in controversy. While the
Secretary does select the mediator, the process is not as biased as the Fifth
Circuit believes. Whether it is a court or the Secretary selecting the mediator,
the mediator will be a neutral party.
Third, the court holds that another material difference in the Secretarial
Procedures is that the Secretary can disregard the decision of the mediator, as
well as the proposals of the state and tribe. 5 2  Under the Secretarial
Procedures, the Secretary either approves or disapproves the proposal chosen
by the mediator. 53 The Secretary can only disapprove the mediator's decision
for one of seven reasons."' The reasons are generally based on the proposal's
adherence to federal and state law, including IGRA.15 The Secretarial
Procedures further provide that if the Secretary rejects the mediator's proposal
145. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008).
146. 25 C.F.R. § 291.9 (2008).
147. Id.
148. Texas, 497 F.3d at 508.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 524 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
151. 25 C.F.R. § 291.10 (2008).
152. Texas, 497 F.3d at 508.




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
and prescribes her own the Secretary's proposal must reflect the mediator's
proposal "as much as possible," while following IGRA and other federal and
state law.'56
The court's main concern is the Secretary has too much power to create her
own Class III gaming procedures if she is able to unilaterally reject the
proposal chosen by the mediator.' The court did not elaborate on the reasons
why it thinks the Secretary has "unbridled power" in prescribing gaming
procedures, but it is likely the court is referring to the language of 25 C.F.R.
§ 291.11(c).'58 Under 25 C.F.R. § 291.11, the Secretary's procedures must
"comport with the mediator's selected proposal as much as possible."' 59 The
language used is different from that of IGRA, but it does not necessarily give
the Secretary any more power. IGRA allows the Secretary to prescribe
procedures for Class III gaming if the state does not accept the mediator's
chosen proposal, and the Secretary's procedures should be consistent with the
proposal the mediator chose and in accordance with IGRA, federal, and state
law. 16
0
The provisions in IGRA are not that different from the Secretarial
Procedures. Under the Procedures, "as much as possible" seems to mean the
Secretary will have to change parts of the proposal that do not comport with
IGRA, state law, federal law, or a select few other reasons, but otherwise the
Secretary's procedures should reflect the proposal chosen by the mediator.
The Secretary can only disapprove the mediator's chosen proposal for seven
reasons, and the Secretary must still follow the mediator's proposal to the
extent possible.
Fourth, the court's final unreasonable difference is the Secretarial
Procedures do not require a tribal-state compact. 6 ' The court said the only
exception to a tribal-state compact under IGRA is if a court finds the state
negotiated in bad faith and the parties went through a court-appointed
mediator. 62 The Secretarial Procedures are meant to fill the gap left by
Seminole Tribe, which prevents a tribe from suing a state claiming sovereign
immunity. If the state and tribe have been unable to agree on a tribal-state
compact at this point, the Secretary takes over where the court usually would
156. Id.
157. See Texas, 497 F.3d at 508.
158. See id.
159. 25 C.F.R. § 291.11 (2008).
160. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (2006).





under IGRA. The Secretarial Procedures are now the one exception to a tribal-
state compact, since the avenue prescribed by Congress was found to be
unconstitutional by Seminole Tribe.'63 For all the reasons discussed previously
with the first three differences listed by the court, the Secretarial Procedures
are about as similar to the provisions of IGRA as possible, without being
unconstitutional. After Seminole Tribe there was not an exception to a tribal-
state compact. The Secretary, through her agency authority, created a new, yet
similar, exception to re-balance the power of tribes and states, after the states
were left with a veto power through the availability of a sovereign immunity
defense.
In summation, under step two of the Chevron test, the court should have
focused on the reasonableness of the Secretarial Procedures and not just the
small differences between the Procedures and IGRA. The Secretarial
Procedures are not perfect, but they are reasonable and reflect the intent
Congress had in enacting IGRA, which is to balance the states' and the tribes'
negotiating power so they can work out an agreement.
B. The Need for Congressional Action
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the parties attempting to appeal this
case. As it stands in the Fifth Circuit, tribes do not have any remedy against
a state that will not negotiate or negotiates in bad faith and then claims
sovereign immunity. Congress's intent was not to give states a vehicle to
disallow tribal Class III gaming.' 64 Rather, the intent was to give states limited
authority, which they did not have after Cabazon, so they could negotiate with
tribes to come to agreements regarding tribal Class III gaming that retained the
interests of both parties.165 Congress did contemplate creating a federal agency
to regulate tribal gaming, but Justice Department officials argued that state
agencies had "the expertise to regulate gaming activities and to enforce laws
related to gaming ...and thus that there was no need to duplicate those
mechanisms on a Federal level."' 66 In accordance with Congress's wish to
uphold tribal sovereignty, Congress used the tribal-state compacts as a
mechanism for allowing the tribe to relinquish aspects of its sovereignty to
state jurisdiction. 1
67
163. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
164. See S. REP. No. 100-446 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 5, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075.
167. Id. at 5-6, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075-76.
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The solutions Congress could use to repair the imbalance of IGRA after
Seminole Tribe and Texas could vary widely, but since the Supreme Court has
not taken the issue, Congress needs to fill the gap. This note will focus on
three possible solutions and discuss whether each one would be in line with
Congress's intent for IGRA and the effect each would have on the states and
tribes.
First, Congress could adopt the Secretarial Procedures.'68 This would give
tribes another approach toward a tribal-state compact. If a state claimed
sovereign immunity when a tribe sued, and the court dismissed the action due
to the state's sovereign immunity, then the tribe could ask the Secretary to
issue Class III gaming procedures.' 69 The Secretary has been willing to take
on the task and the Secretarial Procedures reasonably reflect the intent of
IGRA, so this would be a good solution. The main problem with this solution
is that the Secretary is the trustee for Indian tribes and whether or not there is
an actual bias favoring the tribes, there is a perceived bias.
The Secretarial Procedures do differ from the original provisions of IGRA,
which were discussed in the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Texas, and in
Subpart A of Part V of this note. The differences will not be re-analyzed, but
as covered in the previous subpart, the Secretarial Procedures do reasonably
reflect the intent of Congress in IGRA and are similar to the provisions of
IGRA with only minor differences.
The adoption of the Secretarial Procedures by Congress would have the
most benefit for Indian tribes. The tribes would be the beneficiaries of this
option because as it stands now they do not have any course of action to take
when a state claims sovereign immunity from an Indian tribe's lawsuit. While
the tribes would be the primary beneficiaries, the states would not necessarily
lose any rights. The states would have to negotiate with tribes, but this was
already a requirement under IGRA. The states originally did not have any
right to be involved or regulate gaming on a tribe's reservation under
Cabazon.70 This option still provides states with the privilege to regulate
tribal gaming, which did not exist prior to the enactment of IGRA. Overall,
the adoption of the Secretarial Procedures would restore states' and tribes'
equal bargaining power, thus upholding Congress's original intent behind
IGRA.
17 1
168. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.1 - 291.11 (2008).
169. Id. § 291.3.
170. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).




Second, Congress could adopt the Secretarial Procedures with some
modifications, if they agreed with the Fifth Circuit or found other problems
within the Procedures. The Secretarial Procedures gave the Secretary more of
a role than she had under IGRA. Congress could make modifications
regarding the two main differences between the Secretarial Procedures and
IGRA to take some of the Secretary's involvement away, while still allowing
the Secretary to take the place of the court.
The following modifications that will be discussed take the view of the Fifth
Circuit in Texas and do not reflect the analysis of this note. As a threshold
matter, Congress would have to require the Secretary to determine if the state
negotiated in bad faith before going any further. Next, the selection of the
mediator would have to be modified. Congress could either allow the tribe and
state to agree on a mediator, possibly leading to unnecessary conflict, or
Congress could create a list of acceptable mediators from which the Secretary
could choose. Finally, the Secretary would need to have limited discretion
when prescribing Class III gaming provisions after the mediator has chosen a
proposal. To effectuate this, Congress would need to amend the provision
within IGRA forcing the Secretary to base her Class III gaming procedures on
the proposal selected by the mediator.
This solution would be in line with the concerns and the decision in Texas,
as well as the intent of Congress in IGRA. The Secretary would have an
increased role in the process afforded to the tribe when a state does not
negotiate or negotiates in bad faith. Although her role would be increased, her
power would be limited through the modifications.
Under this solution, there would not be an obvious benefit to either party.
The tribes would still have to prove the state negotiated in bad faith, and the
mediation process would be neutral. An argument can still be made that the
Secretary's increased role in the process would favor the tribes, but with the
appropriate safeguards in place, it would be difficult for the Secretary to assert
a bias.
Third, another path Congress could take would be to repeal IGRA and
revise 18 U.S.C. § I 166(c)(2) to allow Class III gaming without a tribal-state
compact. 7 If Congress repealed IGRA and made Class III gaming legal
without a tribal-state compact, then states would not have any control over
tribal gaming under Cabazon 73 If Congress considers this solution it should
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2006).
173. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202.
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keep the National Indian Gaming Commission to oversee Class II and III
gaming. 74
Congress would not likely take this approach since it does not follow the
intent it had in enacting IGRA. The intent behind IGRA, in particular the
sections governing Class III gaming, was to balance the interests of state and
tribal governments.'75 The states' interests include the interaction of tribal
gaming with the states' public policies and laws, as well as the effect on states'
revenue raising instruments, such as lotteries. 7 6 Similarly, the tribes have
interests in raising revenues to support the tribal community, become
economically self-sufficient, and "regulating activities of persons within its
jurisdictional borders."'
' 77
The tribes would greatly benefit from this solution. The tribes would not
have to rely on a state's willingness to negotiate in order to conduct Class III
gaming on a reservation. Although a tribe would not have to negotiate with
a state, it is likely that it would have to get its gaming proposals approved by
the Department of the Interior, which was the process before the enactment of
IGRA. 178 The Department of the Interior does not have interests like the states,
so the tribes still benefit from this solution by having the ability to fulfill their
interests.
The interests of the states would not be served by this solution, since the
states would not have any authority over tribal gaming. State interests in tribal
gaming should not outweigh or even be balanced with the tribes' interests,
considering that tribes are only subordinate to the federal government and
states only have jurisdiction over tribes if Congress expressly delegates that
authority to the states. 79 Although the states' interests do not have to be
considered, Congress has found the need to include the states in tribal Class
III gaming, and part of that need was to prevent the duplication of gaming
regulatory agencies on the federal level since states already have sufficient
agencies. 8 ° Bearing in mind Congress's concerns and intent, it is unlikely
174. The Commission was established under IGRA as an independent agency within the
Department of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006).
175. See S. REP. No. 100-446, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071.
176. Id. at 13, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 3, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3072.
179. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987); see
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154
(1980).
180. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5, as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075.
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Congress would implement a solution eliminating states from the Class III
gaming process.
VI. Conclusion
The Texas court erred in parts of its Chevron test analysis. The Secretary
has general conferred authority to fill the gap in IGRA left after the decision
in Seminole Tribe. The Secretarial Procedures allowing tribes an opportunity
to get Class III gaming procedures, even if a state claims sovereign immunity,
are reasonable under step two of the Chevron test. The Fifth Circuit's holding
has now rendered the Secretarial Procedures invalid, at least in the Fifth
Circuit. Unless Congress takes action and adopts the Secretarial Procedures
or.creates a new avenue for tribes to take if a state claims sovereign immunity,
then states will continue to have a veto power over tribes in negotiating Class
III gaming procedures, which is not what Congress intended.
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